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Summary  
The recent empirical studies on innovation and market value suggest that R&D has 
a strong complementarity with market share in the market valuation of firms. 
Blundell, Griffith and Reenen (1999) argue that it represents the strategic 
preemptive effect, while Hall and Vopel (1997) suggest a Schumpeterian reason (the 
cost of financing R&D is lower for large firms). The theoretical framework of these 
studies is the classical work by Griliches (1981), which postulates that the market 
value of a firm is given by the sum of the values of physical capital and R&D capital 
with respective multipliers. However, non-rivalry in using new knowledge within a 
firm makes this framework highly questionable. This paper examines the nexus 
between R&D and market value, based on a simple but new structural model. Major 
findings are the following. First, the new model shows that the market evaluation of 
R&D may well be high for a firm with a large market share, simply due to its 
appropriability advantage. Second, our estimation based on the data of the 
Japanese firms shows that the new specification performs better. Third, it shows 
that there is no statistical support for the prevalence of preemption effect.   
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I. Introduction 
The recent empirical studies on R&D and market value suggest that R&D has a 
strong complementarity with market share in the stock market valuation of firmsi. 
More specifically, while a firm with a large market share tends to enjoy high market 
valuation of both tangible and R&D investments, such effect looks to be especially 
strong for R&D investment. Such relationship was first pointed out by Blundell, 
Griffith and Reenen (1999) based on their study of British manufacturing firms for 
the time period of 1972-1982. They found that the interaction term between market 
share and R&D variable had a significantly positive coefficient in the equation 
explaining the market value of a firm, even controlling the effects of market share 
and R&D individually. Hall and Vopel (1997) confirmed such relationship, based on 
their study of US firms for the time period form 1987-1991, although Toivane, 
Stoneman and Bosworth (2002) did not find it from the more recent (1989-1995) 
data of UK firms. Blundell, Griffith and Reenen (1999) argue that their finding that 
the marginal return of R&D is high for a firm with large market share represents 
the strategic preemption effect or efficiency effect due to Gilbert and Newbery 
(1982). Hall and Vopel (1997) suggest a Schumpeterian reason (the cost of financing 
R&D is lower for large firms), given their finding that the marginal return of R&D 
depends more on firm size than on market shareii.  
  These studies, however, may have the following fundamental problem. 
Their estimation is based on the model of market value determination, which treats 
R&D investment in the same manner as tangible investment. In particular, they are 
based on the classical work by Griliches (1981), which postulates that the market 
value of a firm is given by the sum of the values of physical capital and R&D capital  3
with respective multipliers. However, knowledge created by R&D has a unique 
characteristic that its use is non-rival, i.e. the expansion of its use within a firm 
costs nothing, unlike investment in plant and equipment. Consequently, the linear 
homogeneity assumption of the profit function which is an essential assumption of 
the concept of the capital aggregate (Hayashi and Inoue (1991)) does not hold, when 
the capital of a firm consists of both knowledge and tangible capital. Thus, the 
above market power interpretation of the nexus between R&D, market share and 
market value may depend on a wrong underlying model.   
  This paper attempts to investigate this nexus by developing a structural 
model of market value determination as well as by providing the estimates based on 
that model. First, it presents a simple structural model, which explicitly takes into 
account the non-rivalry in using knowledge within a firm. The model shows that the 
stock market evaluation of R&D can be high for a firm with a large market share, 
simply due to its appropriability advantage. Second, it estimates the model 
explaining the market value of a firm, based on both conventional specification due 
to Griliches (1981) and on the new specification, using the data of the Japanese 
firms (1991-2000). It shows that the new specification does better than the 
conventional one in explaining the market value of a firm. While it confirms that 
the relationship found by Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) holds for the 
Japanese industry, it also shows that the interaction term between market share 
and R&D has a larger coefficient for the sub-sample of the firms with lower market 
shares.  Third, we evaluate the effect of interaction term between market share 
and R&D, based on the “true” model of market value determination, and finds that 
a firm with larger market share has actually a lower marginal return from R&D.    4
  The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section II 
presents an analytical framework. Section III discusses empirical specification and 
data and section IV presents the estimation results and discuss them. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Analytical framework 
First, let us describe the conventional specification, the origin of which is Griliches 
(1981). The market value of a firm is given by the following specification.   
) ( IK K V λ θ + =                               ( 1 )  
where K is the value of tangible capital stock, IK is the value of intangible capital 
stock,  λ is the relative shadow price of intangible asset, andθ represents the 
divergence between the market value of a firm and the sum of its tangible and 
intangible capital stocks. θ  is supposed to reflect both the monopoly position of a 
firm and the risk it faces. Defining Tobin’s q as the market value relative to the 
tangible capital stock ( K V q / = ), we have 
) / 1 ( K IK q λ θ + =                              ( 2 )  
Taking the logarithms of both sides, and assuming that  K IK / λ is significantly less 
than 1, we have 
K IK K V q / ln ) / ln( ln λ θ + ≅ =            (3)    
  In this framework a firm with high market power (higher  θ) can generate 
more profit from both tangible and intangible capital stocks. Reflecting this, 
empirical studies have postulated that market share is one determinant of  θ  (see, 
Jaffe (1986), Hall and Vopel (1997), Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) and 
Toivane, Stoneman and Bosworth (2002)). If a firm with market power can generate  5
profit from its intangible capital stock on top of this effect, the market share would 
increase not only θ  but also λ. Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) finds 
empirical evidence supporting this, and argue that this shows the preemptive effect 
of R&D by a firm with market power, given that the appropriability advantage of 
such firm is being controlled by a market share variable as affectingθ . 
  The conventional model, however, has the following two problems. First, 
R&D investment is treated in the same manner as tangible investment, so that 
non-rivalry in using new knowledge within a firm is ignored. Second, market power 
is exogenous with respect to R&D investment. As an alternative, we consider the 
following structural model, which explicitly takes into account these two aspects. 
We consider a two-period model for simplicity. Both tangible and intangible 
investments are made in the first period and output is produced in the second 
period. c represents constant marginal capital cost of production, p is the market 
price of a product(net of the payment of non-capital costs such as material, utility 
and labor costs), y is the output, K is tangible capital stock at the end of the first 
period (investment in the first period), IK is the intangible capital stock at the end 
of the first period (investment in the first period), Π  is the profit in the entire 
periods, V is the market value of the firm at the end of the first period. The tangible 
capital stock K necessary to produce y in the second period is given by 
cy K =                                           ( 4 ) .  
Assuming that interest rate is zero for simplicity, we have 
IK K py IK y c p − − = − − = Π ) (                   ( 5 )  
∏ + + = = IK K py V                             ( 6 ) .  
Thus, Tobin’s q in this specification is given by  6
c p cy py K V q / / / = = =                                      ( 7 )  
R&D has the effect of increasing (expected) price cost margin (p/c) and thus 
q. In the context of competition for a drastic innovation a firm with larger R&D has 
a higher probability to win the race, so that it is more likely to enjoy a monopoly 
position. Alternatively, in the context of competition through non-drastic 
innovations, such firm is more likely to have quality and/or cost advantage. Thus, 
we have the following specification of Tobin’s q, taking into accounts of a possible 
diminishing return of such investment as well as the negative effect of supply 
expansion on price (see the Appendix for elaborations): 
K IK IK c c p q 3
2
2 1 0 ) ( 2 / 1 1 / ) ( 1 β β β β − − + + = − + =              ( 8 ) .  
0 β   reflects both the effects of industry R&D investment on the price cost margin of 
the firm as well as the effect of non-R&D advantages of a firm such as more efficient 
labor use (note that p is net of material and labor costs). We expect that  0 1 > β , 
0 2 > β  and  0 3 > β . Note that we have an implicit assumption here that a firm 
appropriates the return from its intangible investment only by using the knowledge 
for its production.   
Combining equations (7) and (8), we have 
) ) ( 2 / 1 1 ( 3
2
2 1 0 K IK IK K V β β β β − − + + =                             ( 9 )  
Although K and IK are jointly determined to maximize V, K is partially exogenous 
with respect to IK, since non-R&D advantage such as efficient use of manufacturing 
labor increases the level of K for a given IK. For an example, a firm with lower 
non-capital costs should have higher price p (higher  0 β ), so that it would have a  7
higher level of tangible capital for a given level of R&D investment (it is easy to 
show that the profit maximizing K increases with 0 β   from equation (9)). Larger K in 
turn improves the marginal return of R&D investment. Thus, a firm with larger 
complementary asset (due to lower non-capital costs) can exploit more effectively 
the knowledge generated by R&D, due to non-rivalry in the use of knowledge within 
a firm.   
There is a very significant difference between the conventional model and 
the new model in the following respect. What mattes in the determination of q is the 
ratio between intangible capital stock and tangible capital stock in the conventional 
specification (equation (2)), while it is the absolute level of intangible capital stock 
according to the new model (equation (8)). To put it in another way, what matters in 
the determination of the market value of the firm is the intangible capital stock 
according to the conventional specification, but it is the product of tangible and 
intangible capital stocks in the new specification. The difference arises due to the 
following reason. In the new specification, the intangible capital stock or knowledge 
affects price cost margin, and the market value of a firm depends on the product 
between its price cost margin and the size of its tangible capital stock. Thus, a large 
firm (due to low non-capital costs) has the advantage that it can more extensively 
use knowledge as reflected in price cost margin. On the other hand, intangible 
capital stock is treated as an addition to tangible capital stock in the conventional 
specification, reflecting its basis on an accounting formula, so that the above effect 
is lost. 
The new model (equation (8) or (9)) provides a straightforward explanation 
why the stock market evaluation of R&D is found to be high when a firm has a large  8
market share. This is based on the appropriability advantage of such firm: the firm 
with large tangible capital stock (thus, a firm with a large market share in an 
industry) can more effectively translate the knowledge created by intangible capital 
stock in the profit, although we have to note that the level of tangible capital stock 
is partially endogenous to intangible investment. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to 
resort to the preemptive motivation of a firm for explaining the larger effect of R&D 
investment of the firm with a larger market share.   
In the long run equilibrium the profit will be dissipated though competition 
(investment and entry). If such dissipation is perfect, price is equal to average costiii. 
Assuming this, the longrun Tobin’ q (qLR ) is given by   
K IK K V qLR / 1 / + = =                         ( 1 0 )  
Thus, what determines q in the longrun in this case is the ratio between intangible 
capital and tangible capital. Equation (10) is identical to Equation (3) when both λ 
and  θ  are unity. Thus, if this longrun relationship prevails, the rejection of the 
conventional model would become difficult. However, if we focus on short-run 
changes over time such as within-firm variation in a few years time interval, the 
above longrun relationship (equation (10)) would be less binding. Thus, panel 
estimation with fixed effects would help us to identify the conventional and new 
models. On the other hand, cross section estimation may provide biased support to 
the conventional model, since missing variables such as management capability 
may be more correlated with the relative R&D investment than with the absolute 
level of R&D.     
      
III. Empirical specification and data  9
In this section, we will establish the following three findings. First, we show that 
the conventional model due to Griliches (1981) is dominated by the new model 
proposed in the last section in explaining the market value of a firm. Second, using 
the conventional specification, we show that the interaction term between market 
share and R&D variable is more significant for the sub-sample of the firms with the 
smallest market shares, rejecting the preemption story, given that the preemption 
motivation would be important only for a firm with market power. Third, using the 
new specification, we show that a firm with a larger market share earns less from 
R&D investment, contrary to the view of preemption effect. 
3.1 Hypotheses and specifications   
The conventional specification (equation (3)) uses the logarithm of the Tobin’ q 
( t i t i t i t i K IK K V q , , , , / ) , ( = ) as a dependent variable, and uses the logarithm of the value 
of tangible assets ( t i K , ln ), the ratio between intangible asset and tangible asset 
( t i K IK , ) / ( ), and the firms’ market share ( t i MS, ) as independent variables: 
t i i t i t i t i t i u K IK MS K q , , 2 , 1 , , ) / ( ln ) 1 ( ln ε β β σ + + + + − =                   ( 1 1 )  
σ is a parameter supposed to indicate the scale economy of production (if there is 
economy of scale in production, σ exceeds one).The market share is used to measure 
the profitability of the assets due to the existence of market power.  i u  is the 
unobserved firm-level fixed effect and the  t i, ε is the error term. We generalize this 
specification, so that it can cover the new specification (see equation (8)) as well.   
t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i u IK IK K IK MS K q ,
2
, 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , , ) ( 2 / 1 ) / ( ln ) 1 ( ln ε β β β β σ + + − + + + − =       ( 1 2 )  
We absorb the price effect of supply expansion(the last term of equation (8)) by the  10
first term of this equation, so that  σ in this specification can reflect both economy 
of scale in production and demand elasticity. If the correct model is the new model, 
we would find that  2 β  is  insignificant  while  3 β   is significant. If the reverse is the 
case, the conventional model is supported. 
Secondly, we estimate the following model based on the conventional model, 
which is used by Blundell, Griffith and Reenen (1999) to evaluate the preemption 
effect.  
t i i t i t i t i t i t i u K IK MS K IK MS K q , , 5 , 2 , 1 , , ) / * ( ) / ( ln ) 1 ( ln ε β β β σ + + + + + − =         ( 1 3 )  
We allow  5 β  to vary across the sub-samples with different level of market shares 
Since the preemptive motive would be important and would be successful only for 
the firms with significant market power, we would find that  5 β  for the firms with 
smaller market shares is smaller than that with the largest market shares, if the 
conventional model is correct.  Finally, assuming that the new specification 
(equation (8)) is a correct model, we estimate the following model to investigate 
whether a firm with a larger market share in fact earns more from R&D: 
t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i u IK MS IK IK MS K q , , 6
2
, 4 , 3 , 1 , , ) * ( ) ( 2 / 1 ln ) 1 ( ln ε β β β β σ + + + − + + − =  
In particular, if the preemption motivation is significant and is realized, we would 
find that  6 β   is positive and significant. 
  In estimating these equations, we use fixed effect estimation for the 
following three reasons (, although we will also report the result of random effect 
estimation for the purpose of a comparison). First, there are a number of firm 
specific missing variables ( i u ), which are likely to be correlated with independent  11
variables (for an example, a firm with high management capability would be able to 
undertake more R&D investment). Second, we will use an unbalanced panel for 
estimation, given that there are a significant number of entries and exits with 
respect to the stock market. Since only those firms with consistently high market 
value tend to stay in the stock market, we may have the sample selection bias, 
unless we remove the firm fixed effect. Third, as pointed out earlier, cross section 
estimation may significantly reflect the long run relationship between q and the 
ratio between intangible and tangible assets, so that it can provide a biased-support 
to the conventional model. In addition to using a fixed effect estimation, we 
introduce yearly dummies as well as industry by year dummies to control the effects 
of macroeconomic or industry-wide changes, including the changes in demand 
growth, technological opportunities and competition on the stock market price.   
3.2 Data sources and construction of variables 
We have three matched data sources. The financial structure of the firms are from 
the NEEDS database (Nikkei Electronic Economic Database Systems) which uses 
mainly the annual financial reports by the firms to the financial regulatory 
authority of Japan. Information on R&D, advertisement and establishment year as 
well as the sales of a firm by segments are from the Basic Survey of Business 
Structure and Activity (Kigyoukatsudou-kihonn-chousa) by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, which is a compulsory survey. It covers all 
manufacturing and distribution sectors, as well as some additional sectors. Since 
the available Surveys were those conducted in 1991FY, 1994FY and every year 
thereafter up to 2000 FY, we use four data points (1991, 1994, 1997 and 2000 fiscal 
years). The information on market value of a firm is from the Worldscope database.  12
The timing of stock market information is chosen so that the stock market fully 
assimilates the financial and business information of a particular fiscal year. In 
particular, the market value of a firm as of the end of the following calendar year 
(mostly 9 months after the closure of the fiscal year) is chosen to correspond to the 
financial status and business activities of the firm of the fiscal year which mostly 
end on the March 31st . 
  We constructed the variables for estimation in the following manner: 
(1)Value of tangible asset ( t i K , ): We use the total asset of a firmiv. Since most firms 
do not capitalize R&D and advertisement expenditures, these expenditures and the 
total asset are non-overlapping separate contributions to the market value of a firm 
in most cases. Since we use the book values both for the total asset and for the debt 
of a firm due to our data constraintv, we introduce the structure of the assets (to be 
explained next) to control the divergence between the book value and the market 
value, which is very likely to vary across types of assets.   
(2) Structure of the total assets: The variables we use for controlling the divergence 
between the book value and the market value are the current asset ratio 
(cai,t=current asset/total asset), the proportion of the financial investments 
(invai,t=financial investments/total assets), the proportion of land (landi,t=land/total 
assets), and debt asset ratio (debtasseti,t). Since the value of land dropped 
significantly in Japan in 1990s, the proportion of land in the total assets is expected 
to affect the market value of a firm significantly.   
(3) Market value and Tobin’s q ( t i MV,  and  t i q , ): The market value of a firm is 
defined as the sum of the total market capitalization of a firm as of the end of the  13
calendar year and the book value of its debt. 
(4) Intangible investments ( t i IK , ): We distinguish two types of intangible capital: 
R&D (rdi,t) and advertisement(advi,t). R&D of a firm is the sum of the investment 
internally implemented and that outsourced. Since the length of data available for 
this study is limited, we use flow value of R&D in stead of stock value. The past 
studies by Hall (1993a, 1997) suggest that these two measures do not have much 
difference in explaining the market value of a firm (the flow value often has a 
higher explanatory power).   
(5) Market share ( t i MS, ) : The market is defined at three-digit industry level (59 
industries for manufacturing sector and 152 industries for all sectors) and the 
market share of a firm is defined as the ratio between the sales (domestic and 
export sales) of each firm and the sum of the sales of all firms covered by the Basic 
Survey of Business Structure and Activity. Although the Basic Survey is compulsory, 
it neither covers small firms nor imports. However, since we introduce industry by 
year dummies as independent variables and use firm-level fixed effect estimation, 
we can significantly avoid the potential biases due to the incomplete coverage of the 
survey.  When a firm operates in more than one industry, we use a weighted 
average of its market shares, with its sales in each industry segment as a weight.   
(6) Age ( t i age, ): It is the difference between 2002 and the establishment year of a 
firm. We use this variable as a control variable in random effect estimation. 
  Our sample is an unbalanced panel, consisting of 2,367 firms, with 102 
industry affiliations in total, and covering four years (1991, 1994, 1997, 2000). 1,353 
firms belong to the manufacturing sector, with 57 industry affiliations.  The  14
summary statistics are provided in Table 1. 
                         ( T a b l e   1 )  
IV. Estimation results 
Table 2 shows the results of four estimations based on the general specification 
covering both conventional and new models ( equation (12)). Estimation 1 in the 
Table shows that the R&D investment as well as its square is highly significant (1% 
level) while the R&D investment relative to the total asset (relative R&D 
investment) is insignificant. Thus, the estimation results strongly favor the new 
model, relative to the conventional model. The significantly negative coefficient of 
the R&D investment squared suggests a diminishing return on R&D investment on 
price cost margin. Neither absolute nor relative advertisement investment has a 
significant coefficient. The coefficient of the tangible capital is negative and 
significant, although it is relatively small (-0.1).   
              ( T a b l e   2 )  
  Estimation 2 and 3 provide robustness checks. Estimation 2 limits the 
sample to the manufacturing sector, and Estimation 3 limits the sample to those 
firms which did R&D for all four years. The estimation results for R&D are highly 
consistent with that of Estimation 1. The absolute level of R&D investment is 
highly significant, while its relative level is insignificant. There are two differences. 
One is higher significance of the advertisement investment relative to the total 
asset. In these estimations, the relative advertisement expenditure, rather than its 
absolute level, matters unlike the case of R&D investment. The second difference is 
that the coefficient of the tangible capital is positive and significant for the 
consistent performers of R&D (Estimation3).  15
Estimation 4 provides the results of random effect estimation. We added 
the logarithm of firm age as another control variable of the firm heterogeneity.  In 
this estimation not only the absolute level of R&D investment but also its relative 
level is highly significant. This higher significance of the relative R&D investment 
in random effect estimation, however, is likely to be caused by the correlation 
between missing variables such as management capability and the relative R&D 
investment, and by the longrun equilibrium relationship between q and the relative 
R&D  investment.   
  Let us turn to the estimation results based on the conventional model with 
the interaction term between R&D and market share (equation (13)). Estimation 5 
in Table 3 confirms that the relationship found by Blundell, Griffith and Van 
Reenen (1999) holds for the Japanese industry too. The interaction term between 
market share and R&D investment has a highly significantly positive coefficient. 
Thus, if the conventional model were a true model, this result might be interpreted 
to show that a firm with a larger market share gains more from R&D investment, 
which is consistent with preemption effect. However, the next estimation 
(Estimation 6 in Table 3) shows that the coefficient of the interaction term is 
significantly larger for the sub-sample of middle share firms or lowest share firms 
than for the firms with the largest market shares. Thus, the above market power 
interpretation cannot be supported.     
                   ( T a b l e   3 )  
The positive coefficient of the interaction term as observed in Estimation 5 
can be explained easily by the new model, without resorting to preemption effect. 
Since market share is likely to be nearly proportional to the level of tangible capital  16
of a firm for a given industry, we have the following relationship: 
      IK K IK K K IK MS α α = ≈ / * / *                                 ( 1 5 )  
This is nothing but the third term of equation (8). That is, the interaction term is 
very likely to have simply picked up the effect of R&D investment on price cost 
margin. The lower coefficient of the interaction term for the firms with the largest 
market shares is likely reflect the diminishing return of R&D investment on price 
cost margin.   
There is a remaining question of whether the preemption effect holds in the 
“true” model. Estimation 7 in Table 3 offers an answer. According to the estimation, 
the interaction term between market share and R&D has a negatively significant 
coefficient (5% level). That is, a firm with a larger market share has actually a lower 
marginal return from R&D. Thus, the statistical evidence from market value and 
R&D investment does not provide support at all to the view that strategic 
preemption effect is prevalent.   
V. Conclusion 
This paper may have the following two contributions. First, we have shown that a 
structural model of market value determination (although a very simple one) 
implies that the Tobin’s q depends on the absolute level of R&D and not on its 
relative value with respect to the tangible capital.    This has hopefully clarified the 
pitfall in regarding the accounting definitional relationship as a structural equation. 
Second, we have tested the empirical validity of such structural model. One major 
implication of this empirical exercise is that the statistical evidence is against the 
prevalence of preemption effect.   
There are a number of research issues to be pursued. One is to understand  17
the difference between R&D and advertisement investments. This paper has shown 
that R&D follows pretty much the structural model presented, while the 
advertisement investment does not. Moreover, the relative advertisement 
investment rather than the absolute investment is significant in some estimations, 
unlike the case of R&D. This may indicate that advertisement investment is more to 
do with delivery of knowledge or information to consumers than to do with their 
creation. The second issue is to explore the inter industry differences of the 
relationship between intangible investments and market value, given a varying 
appropriability conditions across industries.    18
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Appendix  1   Price  cost  margin  and  R&D 
This appendix illustrates two important channels by which R&D increases the price 
cost margin of a firm. First, a firm with larger R&D investment is more likely to win 
the race of drastic innovations. Let us assume that a successful firm has the 
monopoly price cost margin ( c c p / ) ( 0 − ) protected by a patent and an unsuccessful 
firm has a zero margin. The probability of firm j in winning the patent race 
( ) ( Pr win j ) depends positively on its level of R&D investment (IKj) and negatively on 
the industry aggregate R&D (IKA), so that the expected price cost margin of firm j is 
given by 
c c p win c c p E j j / ) ( ) ( Pr / ) ( 0 − × = −                 ( a . 1 )  
2
2 1 0 ) ( 2 / 1 ) ( Pr j j j IK IK win δ δ δ − + =                 ( a . 2 )  
We absorb the negative effect of industry R&D on the winning probability of firm j 
by the constant term ( 0 δ ). Thus, the combination of these two equations allows us 
to get equation (8) in the main text. Note that the price cost margin ( c c p / ) ( 0 − ) 
itself may depend positively on R&D investment (IKj), since larger R&D may enable 
a firm to acquire a patent with a large scope when it wins. Even if patent protection 
is not granted, a firm moving quickly in innovation race has the first mover 
advantage in production. Thus, R&D investment enhances the probability of 
winning the innovation race and the expected profitability. 
The second channel is quality and/or cost advantage due to larger R&D in 
non-drastic innovation competition. Let us assume that firm j can produce a good 
with quality z in terms of consumers surplus for marginal cost c, while its  21
competitor produces a good with quality z* for cost c*. Bertrand competition forces 
them to set prices p and p* in the following manner: 
 
* * p z p z − = −                         ( a . 3 )  
If we assume that firm j has a competitive advantage, its competitor is forced to set 
its price at its cost (
* * c p = ). Thus, firm j has the following price cost margin: 
c c c z z c c p j / )} ( ) {( / ) (
* * − + − = −                ( a . 4 )  
This clearly shows that a firm which improves the quality of its product (z) or 
reduces its cost (c) by R&D has higher price cost margin. Since quality and cost 
advantage depends on the level of R&D investment by a firm (IKj), we can obtain 
the following expression , similar to equation (8) in the main text. 
2
2 1 0 ) ( 2 / 1 / ) ( j j j IK IK c c p β β β − + = −  
  The above relationship between R&D and price cost margin holds for the 
other models of competition. Let us consider cost advantage in quantity competition 
with homogeneous goods (i.e Cournot competition). If we assume constant elasticity 
market demand curve, it is well-known that the price cost margin of firm j is given 
by 
   ε / / ) ( j j s p c p = − ,                               ( a . 5 )  
where  ε   is the price elasticity of market demand. Since a firm with lower marginal 
cost of production has a higher market share, it has to have a larger price cost 
margin. Thus, cost-reducing R&D investment increases price cost margin. In the 
case of a linear demand, the price cost margin is given by 
   } 1 /{ ) 1 ( 1 / ) ( ∑ + + − = − k j j c c N p c p ,                ( a . 6 )   22
where  p − 1  is the market demand and N is the total number of firms. It is 
immediately clear that a firm with lower cost has a higher price cost margin. 
Let us turn to the case of price competition with differentiated products.  
Higher quality of the product offered by firm j makes its reaction curve shift out in 
the diagram of price competition, since the willingness to pay of its consumers 
increases. This tends to increase the price of firm j . The opposite move will happen 
to the reaction curve of the competitor of firm j. This tends to reduce the price of 
firm  j. Since the first effect is likely to be more important, the firm which is 
successful in improving its product quality by R&D can increase its price as well as 




                                                  
i See Hall (1999) for a comprehensive review of the literature on the approaches to 
using market value to assess innovation performance. There are a number of 
advantages to use market value as the performance measure of R&D. First, it reflects 
the assessment of the future effects of past and current R&D, unlike accounting profit. 
Second, it reflects the assessment of the firm by the third parties, while the accounting 
profit can be adjusted based on the view of the management (see Fisher and McGowan 
(1983) for the problems of accounting profit).   
ii Schumpeter (1942) pointed out a number of potential advantages of a large firm or a 
firm with a large market share in innovation. Low cost of financing, including its ability 
to pool risk, is one of them. In addition, such firm may have higher ability to 
appropriate the benefit of R&D. It may also have an advantage due to economy of scale 
or scope of R&D.     
iii Generally the longrun profit would depend on entry barriers, although Salinger 
(1984) finds no significant support to the existence of such longrun entry barriers. 
iv  The total asset of a firm covers financial investments such as equity investments and 
the value of intellectual property rights purchased. 
v Hall (1993a,b) and Blundell et al. (1999) report that there is no significant effect due 
to the difference between the book value and constructed value. Table 1 Summary statistics  (Obs 6966)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. q lnasset ms rd rda adv adva age ca inva land debtasset
q 1.215 0.917 1
lnasset 10.742 1.346 0.022 1
ms 0.013 0.030 0.045 0.506 1
rd 0.004 0.023 0.052 0.392 0.323 1
rda 0.017 0.024 0.069 0.204 0.079 0.372 1
adv 0.001 0.005 0.070 0.463 0.385 0.606 0.173 1
adva 0.010 0.022 0.050 0.022 0.032 -0.001 -0.042 0.335 1
age 51.147 14.210 -0.098 0.252 0.125 0.093 0.115 0.072 -0.135 1
ca 0.560 0.162 0.021 -0.089 -0.106 -0.047 0.053 -0.124 -0.121 0.006 1
inva 0.156 0.105 0.005 0.281 0.151 0.151 0.018 0.229 0.167 0.014 -0.486 1
land 0.091 0.077 -0.071 -0.185 -0.081 -0.099 -0.208 -0.035 0.095 -0.194 -0.516 -0.064 1
debtasset 0.560 0.204 0.004 0.071 0.033 -0.012 -0.122 -0.040 -0.106 0.177 0.039 -0.097 -0.0374 1Table 2　Estimation results (I)
lnq Coef. Std. Err. lnq Coef. Std. Err. lnq Coef. Std. Err. lnq Coef. Std. Err.
lnasset -0.099 0.016 *** lnasset 0.036 0.023 lnasset 0.060 0.027 ** lnasset 0.000 0.006
ms -0.074 0.240 ms 0.486 0.391 ms -0.176 0.303 ms 0.249 0.197
rda -0.190 0.321 rda 0.270 0.338 rda -0.292 0.410 rda 0.751 0.249 ***
rd 5.516 1.037 *** rd 4.545 1.040 *** rd 6.910 1.499 *** rd 3.159 0.747 ***
rd2 -7.637 2.592 *** rd2 -5.567 2.578 ** rd2 -6.215 3.194 * rd2 -5.718 2.078 ***
adva -0.033 0.467 adva 2.742 0.705 *** adva 1.674 0.905 * adva 0.868 0.284 ***
adv 5.895 4.141 adv -7.357 5.102 adv -8.660 8.171 adv 1.722 2.613
adv2 -13.552 46.256 adv2 70.286 50.482 adv2 180.504 117.515 adv2 37.925 35.483
lnage -0.113 0.016 ***
1994 -0.167 0.091 * 1994 -0.095 0.281 1994 -0.247 0.295 1994 -0.187 0.091 **
1997 -0.356 0.088 *** 1997 -1.153 0.366 *** 1997 -0.923 0.279 *** 1997 -0.360 0.086 ***




























 Number of obs      =      6966  Number of obs      =      4326 Number of obs      =      3421 Number of obs      =      6964
Number of groups   =      2367 Number of groups   =      1353 Number of groups   =       961 Number of groups   =      2367
R-sq:within  = 0.4866  Obs/group: min = 1 R-sq:within  = 0.5083 Obs/group: min =1 R-sq:within = 0.5153 Obs/group: min = 1 R-sq:within = 0.4752 Obs/group: min 1
between = 0.0187   avg =  2.9        between = 0.1192  avg =       3.2        between = 0.1298 avg =3.6        between = 0.2219   avg = 2.9
overall = 0.1060  max = 4        overall = 0.2401  max =         4        overall = 0.2087 max = 4        overall = 0.3115 max = 4
F(308,4291)        =     13.21 F(187,2786)        =     15.40 F(254,2206)        =      9.23  Wald chi2(411)     =   4535.34
     sigma_u |  .36415613      sigma_u |  .31126491      sigma_u |  .36388534      sigma_u |  .25992874








***: 1%significant, *:5%signfiicant, *:10% significant
Estimation３：Fixed-effects regression for




manufacturing firms Estimation1: Fixed-effects regression
Yes
YesTable 3　Estimation (II)
lnq Coef. Std. Err. lnq Coef. Std. Err. lnq Coef. Std. Err.
lnasset -0.083 0.016 *** lnasset -0.086 0.016 *** lnasset -0.098 0.016 ***
ms -0.626 0.280 ** ms -0.699 0.281 ** ms 0.099 0.254
rda 0.324 0.307 rda -0.146 0.345 rd 5.962 0.996 ***
msrda 28.786 6.788 *** msrda　 29.376 6.821 *** rd2 -6.678 2.458 ***
adva 0.500 0.401
msrda: additional effect for
middle share firms
Note2 51.630 26.091 ** msrd -7.425 3.650 **
msrda: additional effect for
lowest share firms
Note2 488.939 194.631 ** adv 4.442 3.663
adva 0.468 0.401 adv2 11.387 45.069
1994 -0.188 0.091 ** 1994 -0.188 0.091 ** 1994 -0.168 0.091 *
1997 -0.373 0.089 *** 1997 -0.368 0.088 *** 1997 -0.356 0.088 ***
2000 -1.135 0.292 *** 2000 -1.115 0.292 *** 2000 -1.151 0.290 ***
Financial
structure Yes Financial structure Yes Financial
structure Yes
Industry by
year dummies Yes Industry by time dummies Yes Industry by
time dummies Yes
Number of obs      =      6966 Number of obs      =      6966 Number of obs      =      6966
Number of groups   =      2367 Number of groups   =      2367 Number of groups   =      2367
R-sq:within  = 0.4813 Obs/group: min = 1 R-sq: within  = 0.4824 Obs/group: min =1 R-sq:  within  = 0.4871Obs/group: min =1
       between = 0.0148 avg =       2.9        between = 0.0144  avg =       2.9        between = 0.0205 avg =       2.9
       overall = 0.0964  max =         4        overall = 0.0938     max =         4        overall = 0.1095max =         4
 F(305,4294)        =     13.07  F(307,4292)        =     13.03  F(307,4292)        =     13.28
     sigma_u |  .36399399      sigma_u |  .36557271      sigma_u |  .36340249
     sigma_e |  .19514989      sigma_e |   .1949896      sigma_e |  .19411073
Note  2.   Top share firms consist of 202 firms, the middle share firms consist of 1149 firms and the lowest share firms consist of 1140 firms. 
Estimation 7：Fixed-effects regression Estimation 5: Fixed-effects regression
Note  1.   ***: 1%significant, *:5%signfiicant, *:10% significant
Estimation 6:Fixed-effects regression